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Abstract 
We use longitudinal data from the Health and Retirement Study on money parent give to adult 
children over sixteen years. We study the scale of giving, regularity over time, and factors 
shaping it.  Parents give $5,000 to children with the one-third of parents who give, averaging 
$14,000 over two years. There is persistence in giving declining with age and resulting in total 
gifts of $50,000 from age 53 to death excluding bequests. Single parents who expect a long life 
span and are risk averse give less money to children; consistent with a lifecycle model of 
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1.  Introduction 
Inter-vivos cash transfers between family members total hundreds of billions of dollars 
each year.  These transfers may take several forms: Adult children may give money to aging 
parents. Siblings may exchange money with other family members. The majority of money, 
however, flows from parents to children.  Cash transfers from parents may finance higher 
education, for example, or the purchase of a house, enhancing the well being of their adult 
offspring. Parental transfers, as insurance against unexpected economic shocks to a child such as 
job loss can mitigate their negative consequences.   That is, the purpose for the transfer as well as 
its magnitude will affect how we measure and conceive of economic vulnerability.  Parents may 
benefit as well, if monetary gifts to children are reciprocated by care giving.  
Beyond any effects within families, cash transfers from parents to adult children may 
contribute to the transmission of socio-economic inequalities more broadly over time. If some 
families give their adult children considerable financial resources, while middle class and poor 
households are unable to do so, this may extend wealth inequality across generations.  
The amount and timing of gifts of this type may have specific policy implications as well. 
For example, when children provide care in exchange for cash transfers as a parent ages, this has 
an impact on the demand for long-term care.  How Social Security policy affects the well being 
of individuals will depend on the motivation for cash transfers between generations.  If 
generations are strongly linked, reducing benefits in response to the financial problems facing 
Social Security and Medicare will have a less severe impact on the beneficiaries:  in response to 
a decrease in benefits, the elderly may simply reduce their transfers to children maintain 
consumption or may begin receiving money from children.  
Yet as important as intergenerational cash transfers are in all of these ways, our 
understanding of them is limited. This is at least in part because prior research on the topic has   3 
relied largely on cross-sectional data, failing to fully exploit longitudinal data that would permit 
analysis of inter-vivos cash transfers over the life cycle. Cross-sectional data do not address, for 
example, the magnitude of money given to children over the parent’s lifetime because, lifetime 
levels will depend on the regularity of the transfer.  Cross-sectional data cannot shed light on 
why some parents give money to children but others do not  - the heterogeneity of giving across 
families– because viewing transfers at a point in time does not provide information about the 
extent to which parents’ gifts to children average out over many years across families. 
Longitudinal data can be used to shed light on these issues and econometric methods may be 
employed to remove potential biases in estimates of the factors that shape this behavior. 
To improve our understanding of this phenomenon, we use longitudinal data on inter-
vivos transfers of money from middle aged and older parents to adult children from the Health 
and Retirement Study. These data span over three decades of time—which is often a large part of 
the remaining life span of the parents making such gifts to their children. We contribute to the 
literature a study of the scale of giving, how regular it is over time, and the factors that shape it.  
The factors we study are motivated and guided by a lifecycle model extended to include inter-
vivos transfers. A life-cycle model with inter-vivos transfers as an argument in the utility 
function generates hypotheses about the age pattern of transfers and how mortality risk, risk 
aversion and economic resources affect giving behavior in a dynamic setting.  
Results show that there is substantial inequality across households in transfers to adult 
children.  Just over one-third of households give money to children each survey wave. 
Conditional on giving, the average amount is $14,000.  Because less than half of households are 
giving at a given point in time, the median transfer amount is zero. But at the 95
th percentile, 
parents are giving $24,000. In terms of the regularity of transfers, over a period of 16 years, most   4 
parents gave at some time to their adult children (75 percent), some not at all (21 percent), and 
only a few always give to children (4 percent). Monetary transfers to children are correlated 
across time; giving in the past is associated with an increase in the likelihood of giving in the 
future.  This heterogeneity in transfers is important for how we conceive of lifetime intervivos 
transfers.  We calculate that the total average amount of money parents give to children over 
their remaining years of life beginning at age 53 is around $50,000.   
Our results indicate that a single parent’s age, mortality risk, level of aversion to risk, and 
economic resources—both wealth and income—are important factors governing giving behavior 
of single parents as is consistent with the predictions of a lifecycle model of giving.  For couples, 
economic resources are important but there is not the expected association with mortality risk 
and risk aversion.  This implies that a lifecycle of model describes financial giving to children 
but incompletely. There remains a large role for household-specific heterogeneity in explaining 
the giving behavior of parents. 
Lastly, we find that parents’ transfers respond to the onset of a disability or acute 
condition with an increase in the likelihood of giving money. One interpretation is that disability 
onset may elicit services from children and parents respond by giving money to them although 
empirical evidence of this is scant.  Alternatively, it may be an indicator of an unexpected 
decrease in expected lifespan so parents respond by increasing transfers to children.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses giving to children 
within a lifecycle model framework and discusses the predictions of the model.  The next section 
describes the scale of giving at a point in time and over much of the remaining life of parents.  
Section 4 estimates an empirical model of transfers using the longitudinal nature of the data to   5 
account for unobserved heterogeneity and examines if giving behavior is consistent with the 
predictions of a life-cycle model. The final section summarizes our main conclusions.   
2.  Background 
Economic theory provides several reasons why parents transfer financial resources to 
children. Altruistic parents transfer resources to children within their lifetimes or posthumously 
because they care about their children’s welfare (Barro, 1974; Becker, 1974, 1981). With an 
exchange motive, children provide care to elderly parents in exchange for money from them or in 
anticipation of future bequests (Cox, 1987; Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers, 1985). Altruistic 
giving implies transfers will tend to go to those children than most need them while giving under 
an exchange motive implies that inter-vivos transfers or bequests will tend to go to those children 
who provided the most net transfers to their parents. 
Empirical research that has found compensatory behavior, for example, an increase in 
transfers in response to a decline in income, finds effects that are far smaller than what a purely 
altruistic compensatory theory would predict (Altonji et al., 1997).  In contrast a positive 
association between a child’s economic circumstances and the amount of money she receive has 
been found in other studies (Cox, 1987 and Cox and Rank 1992) and is more consistent with the 
exchange model. In such a model, the effect of a recipient’s income is ambiguous because it 
depends on the elasticity of supply of and demand for the recipient’s services (Cox, 1987).
1   
Light and McGarry (2004) take a different approach to understanding transfer motives by 
exploring data from the few respondents (less than 10 percent) that intend to give unequal 
                                                 
1 For example, a parent may be able to, as it were, buy more of a lower-income child’s time, yet 
because the price is lower, spend less in total.   6 
bequests and report explanations consistent with both altruism and exchange. The persistent 
empirical finding of equal division of bequests among children is difficult to reconcile with 
either altruism or exchange (Hurd and Smith, 2002; Menchik, 1980; McGarry, 1999).   The 
empirical literature has been silent on how transfers from parents to children evolve over time 
due in large part to data limitations discussed in the introduction.  
In this paper, we motivate our empirical work with a life-cycle model of consumption of 
retired singles by Yaari (1965) and extend it to include inter-vivos transfers.
2  The model does 
not a prior assume a specific motivation for transfers and in fact accommodates several reasons 
for transfers.  Transfers may be an implicit purchase of services such as attention from a child.  
As such, they are like expenditures on any consumption item except that they can only be 
purchased from specific people and the purchase price will depend on the characteristics of those 
people.  They may take place to augment lifetime resources of a child or simply for the pleasure 
of giving.  In the case of a single, retired person, (s)he maximizes expected lifetime utility where 





!tatdt            (1)  
Subject to:   
dwt
dt
=rwt !ct ! ptgt + At ;  wt≥0     (2) 
wt = wealth; ct = consumption; gt = transfers; all at time t 
ρ = subjective time rate of discount; N= fixed age of death; r = fixed real interest rate 
                                                 
2 See also Modigliani, 1988 for life-cycle models of consumption and wealth and Hurd (1995) 
for a model of couples.   7 
u(, ) = utility flow from consumption and transfers; pt = price of transfers (we assume it 
equal to one); at = probability of survival to t; At = annuities at t 
The first order conditions involve the equality of the marginal utility of consumption and the 
marginal utility of inter-vivos transfers and can be solved for the equations of motion of the 
marginal utilities of consumption and transfers, that, with p=1 have the same form:   
dut
dt
=ut(ht +!!r)            (3) 
ut = marginal utility of consumption at time t; ht = mt / at =  mortality risk 
In this model, inter-vivos transfers are simply another consumption item. We assume that once a 
transfer is made it cannot be called back as it has been ‘spent.’ Therefore, risk-averse parents will 
not transfer all they might eventually like to give; rather some transfers will be delayed until they 
become bequests.
3  We also assume that the marginal utility associated with a transfer in not 
changing over time.  This assumption may be most applicable for older children whose socio-
economic status is stable relative to younger children.   
In terms of the model’s predictions for age patterns of transfers, if the subjective time rate 
of discount is greater than the real interest rate then consumption and transfers will always 
                                                 
3 There is empirical support for this assumption.  Few children give money to parents and the 
amount they give is low (Zissimopoulos, 2002).  If money is given to children with the 
expectation that a parent will co-reside with the child later in life, this assumption is violated.  
Using the HRS to examine co-residency, we find about 20% of parents co-reside with a child in 
any given wave.  Using data on who the move helped, we find that 60% said the move was to 
help the parent (33% to help both, 7% to help the child).  Overall only 12% of parents co-reside 
with children primarily for their benefit.    8 
decline (that is dut/dt > 0 and dgt/dt < 0) under the usual assumption about the concavity of u(.,.) 
with u”<0).  If the subjective time rate of discount is less than the real interest rate, then when ht 
(mortality risk) is small, as is true at young ages transfers and consumption may initially rise but 
at older ages, mortality risk (ht) rises approximately exponentially so at some age consumptions 
and transfers begin to decline.
4   
The model also predicts that if economic resources increase, positive transfers will 
increase, and may become positive if previously zero. More specifically, for someone with few 
resources, and, therefore, a low level of total spending, all spending will be on consumption and 
none on transfers because the marginal utility of consumption will be greater than the marginal 
utility of transfers, even at zero transfers.  As resources increase and consumption increases, the 
marginal utility of consumption will fall until at some value of consumption, the marginal utility 
of consumption equals the marginal utility of transfers evaluated at zero transfers.   
Further increases in resources will cause transfers to become positive.  The elasticity of 
transfers with respect to increases in resources will depend on the relative slopes of the marginal 
utility curves.  Should the slope of the transfer curve be substantially greater (in absolute value) 
than the slope of the consumption curve, most of the increase in resources would be spent on 
consumption. In addition, an increase in mortality risk will cause transfers to increase because an 
increase in mortality risk acts like an increase in the discount rate.  Finally, highly risk-averse 
individuals will choose a flat path of transfers and consumption, causing transfers and 
consumption to be reduced and wealth to be higher.  
In this paper, we examine whether the data on transfers from parents to children is 
consistent with these four predictions of how transfers respond to a parent’s age, resources, 
                                                 
4 E.g if r= 0.03, ρ=0 consumption will fall at age 66 for males and 74 for females (Hurd, 1992).   9 
mortality risk and level of risk aversion.
5  The predictions are generated from a model of singles.  
A model for couples is similar in form to singles. However, couples have a utility function 
defined over consumption while both spouses are alive, and they get utility from the bequests 
they would get if his/her spouse died (Hurd, 1995).  This implies that with the usual assumption 
of concavity of utility, the consumption and transfer paths flatten and could even rise with age 
(see Hurd, 1995, for the model and its solution).  
3.  Data Description 
Our research for the U.S. relies on longitudinal data from the Health and Retirement 
Study (HRS), a set of biennial surveys first fielded in 1992 and 1993 by the University of 
Michigan with the objective to monitor economic transitions in work, income, and wealth, as 
well as changes in many dimensions of health status among those over fifty years old.
6   We use 
                                                 
5 The model is easily extended further to include bequests. A strong bequest motive will flatten 
the transfer and consumption trajectories, causing a reduction in transfers and consumption.  
More wealth will be held with the result that expected bequests will increase; that is, resources 
will be shifted from transfers to bequests.  Actual bequests depend on longevity, and for an 
unexpectedly long life, the reduction in transfers will not increase bequests.   
6 The initial survey began as a national sample of about 7,600 households (12,654 individuals) 
with at least one person in the birth cohorts of 1931 through 1941 (about fifty-one to sixty-one 
years old at the wave one interview in 1992).  The second, the Assets and Health Dynamics of 
the Oldest Old (AHEAD), began in 1993 and included 6,052 households (8,222 individuals) with 
at least one person born in 1923 or earlier (seventy years old or older in 1993).  In 1998, HRS 
was augmented with baseline interviews from at least one household member from the birth   10 
eight waves of survey data extremely rich in content and including the following measures 
central to our research: inter-vivos transfers, household wealth and income, subjective survival, 
risk aversion, health measures.  The surveys provide other information pertinent for this study:  
demographic and socio economic data on respondents and their family members. 
Our measures of inter-vivos transfers are based on questions to respondents about 
financial help provided to children in the basic form “Including help with education but not 
shared housing or shared food (or any deed to a house), in the last two years did you or your 
spouse give financial help totaling $500 or more to any of your children (or grandchildren)?”  If 
yes, there are subsequent follow-on questions about the amount of money and to whom the 
money was given.  In the 1992 and 1994 survey waves of the original HRS respondents, the 
transfer questions varied slightly from the more recent waves.  In 1992 financial help of $500 or 
more over one year is asked about and in 1994, the threshold was $100.  To make transfers over 
waves comparable, we assume that two-year transfer amounts are two times the annual giving 
amount in 1992 and censor to zero amounts less than $500 for survey year 1994.  For the 1931 to 
1941 birth cohort entering the survey in 1992, we use a total of 8 waves of data spanning 16 
years of transfers. For the birth cohort 1923 or earlier, that entered the survey in 1993, we use 7 
waves of data covering 14 years of transfers. We use five survey waves, from 1998 to 2006, or 
ten years of comparable data on transfers for all birth cohorts 1947 and earlier.  The birth cohort 
1948 to 1953 entered the survey in 2004 thus only two waves of data are used in the analysis.  
Sample.  Pooling data from all waves on all households with children provides us with 
88,483 household observations where at least one individual of the household is age-eligible. 
                                                                                                                                                           
cohort 1924-1930 and 1942-1947 and was representative of all birth cohorts born in 1947 or 
earlier.   In 2004, the HRS was augmented with interviews from the birth cohort 1948-1953.   11 
Table 1 shows a few select characteristics of the sample by birth cohort. Birth cohorts vary by 
mean and median income, with more recent cohorts having much higher incomes (CPI adjusted) 
due to income growth over time. Since income variation with age has mostly peaked by these 
ages, cohort differences are the main source of income variation Differences in income across 
these cohorts are much larger than differences in wealth as wealth continues to grow with age 
much more than income does.  Birth cohort 1924-1930 has the most children (3.65) and the 
youngest birth cohort has the fewest (2.97).  These data suggest that age patterns of financial 
transfers from parents to children will likely have cohort effects due to differences in wealth, 
income and fertility across cohorts and thus longitudinal data is necessary for describing age 
patterns of transfers. 
Financial Cash Transfers.  Table 2 shows the distribution of the amount of money 
given to children over a two-year time period and the probability an amount of $500 or more is 
given to children by cohort and for all households.  The top panel represents financial cash 
transfers to children for all households with children and the bottom panel shows the distribution 
of financial cash transfers for those household that gave $500 or more to children over a two year 
period. Over one-third of households made a cash transfers to their children (36 percent) over a 
two-year period. Average two-year cash transfers to children are $5,124.  The dispersion of cash 
transfers to children is large:  while the median transfer is zero and the 75
th percentile is $2,474; 
the 95
th percentile is $24,000 and the 99
th is $70,244.  Thus, while the average annual amount a 
child receives (average number of children in 3.3) is small, approximately $800, the children of 
parents at the high end of the distribution are receiving substantial amounts.  
The latest birth cohorts are the most likely to give and give the most to children at all 
points in the distribution.   The latest birth cohorts are also younger and wealthier than earlier   12 
birth cohorts and a life-cycle model of transfers predicts these factors lead to higher transfer 
amounts.  As a percentage of household income, however, the later birth cohorts give a smaller 
percentage of their income to children than the earlier birth cohorts.  Annual cash transfers (two-
year transfers divided by two) are approximately eight percent of a household’s annual income 
($32,988) for the birth cohort born 1923 or earlier, but are only about 3 percent of a household’s 
annual income ($103,967) for birth cohort 1942-1947. Cohort differences in amount of money as 
a percentage of parent’s income likely reflect differences in the need of the cohort’s children.   
The bottom panel of Table 2 shows the distribution of cash transfers among the sample of 
household that give at least $500 to children over a two-year period.  Conditional on giving, the 
dispersion of transfers remains large with mean transfers of $14,051 and median transfers of 
$4,947 for a ratio of mean to median transfers of 2.8.  This dispersion is greater for older 
respondents than younger respondents.  For the birth cohort 1923 or earlier, the ratio of mean 
transfers to median transfers is 3.8 and for the birth cohort 1948-1953, the same ratio is 2.5.  
Indeed, the ratio is higher for transfers compared to wealth (ratio=2.6) and income (ratio=1.7).  
The dispersion in transfers is larger than the dispersion in wealth because of the heterogeneity in 
giving behavior:  some families give money to children and give a large amount and many 
families give nothing.   
Age Pattern of Transfers.  A basic prediction of the life-cycle model described above is 
that at sufficiently advanced ages total consumption and total financial transfers will decline with 
age. These data offer an unexplored and powerful method for testing this fundamental 
implication of the theory because of the panel nature of the survey with many observations of 
monetary transfers made at older ages.  We first show simple tabulations of transfers by age and 
then explore age effects predicted by the life-cycle model in a multivariate framework.   13 
Table 3 shows the probability a parent makes cash transfers and the amount of money 
given to children by age of the parent.  For married couples, the age of one of the partners is 
randomly selected.  The probability a parent makes a cash transfer to any child declines with age, 
for both singles and married couples. At all ages, married couples are more likely to make a 
transfer than singles.  This is expected given that on average, married couples are wealthier than 
singles.  At ages 55 or younger, 49 percent of parents give children cash transfers.  In contrast, 
only 20 percent of parents ages 86 and older give cash transfers to their children. The amount of 
money parents give children is highly non–linear in age. These patterns may be in part picking 
up some of the cohort differences we saw in Table 1 as well as the fact that children are 
becoming increasingly more independent of their parents over time.  
We illustrate the probability of cash transfers by cohort in Figure 1. By cohort, the 
probability parents make cash transfers to children declines with age without much of a 
discernable cohort effect. At ages 60 and younger, the younger birth cohorts are more likely to 
give than the older birth cohorts but at older ages, the likelihood of giving is similar across birth 
cohorts.  
Lifetime Transfer Amounts.  To understand total giving to adult children over a 
lifetime, we ideally would like to follow parents from a given age (e.g. 50) as they transition to 
single status with the death of a spouse and to their death and calculate money given to children 
at each age and sum it over the rest of their lifetime.  We have sixteen years of data and birth 
cohorts than span all ages thus we take advantage of the long panel on transfer amounts and age 
expectations of death from the life tables to calculate ‘rest of life’ transfers to adult children.  
Given the differences in the amount of giving by cohort and marital status and general declines 
in giving with age, we estimate a linear model of transfer amount (CPI adjusted, $2006) as a   14 
function of age, age-squared, birth cohort group (four) indicators and gender separately by 
marital status and use the estimates to predict transfer amounts at each age 53 and older, for 
married couples and male singles and female singles separately (single are assumed not to 
remarry).  With the predictions, we calculate the value of discounted, expected lifetime transfers 
for each cohort.  
Life tables are used to calculate these transfers at each age given age and sex specific 
mortality risks.
7  For example, at each age a married couples’ expected transfers are a function of 
the probability both survive, the husband dies only or the wife dies only.  We use a discount rate 
of 3 percent.  Finally, transfers are summed across all ages, separately for each of the four birth 
cohort groups to arrive at an estimate of lifetime transfers. These are weighted by the percent of 
households married and percent of households with children in 2006 for a population 
representative estimate.    We calculate that the average lifetime transfers by birth cohort are as 
follows: $53,903 for the birth cohort 1923 and earlier; $54,732 for the birth cohort 1924-1930; 
$45,601 for the birth cohort 1931-1941; $50,159 for the birth cohort 1942-1947 and $50,465 for 
the birth cohort 1948-1953.
8  
To get a sense of how large total transfers to children are including bequests we use data 
from Hurd and Smith (2002) on expected bequests and wealth for the 1923 and earlier birth 
cohorts and perform some ‘back-of-the-envelope’ calculations for this cohort.  Hurd and Smith 
report average estimated bequests are $129,600 for the 1923 and earlier birth cohorts and 
discounted 20 years is $71,756.
9  Our estimate of this cohort’s expected, discounted intervivos 
                                                 
7 Lifetables from http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr56/nvsr56_09.pdf 
8 Lifetime transfers for Early Boomers are calculated based on observed transfers over 4 years. 
9 See Hurd and Smith (2002) for calculations of expected bequests.  We use discount rate 0.03.   15 
transfers over twenty years, from ages 75-95, is $17,346.   Thus intervivos and bequests ($89,102 
total) are about 30 percent of wealth at age 75 ($303,600).  
Persistence of Cash Transfers.  To the extent that inter-vivos transfers respond 
principally to transitory shocks (e.g. unemployment) or expected or unexpected changes in 
circumstances (e.g. going to college), they may appear to be quite episodic with some state 
dependence.  Cross-sectional data on such transfers cannot tell us about the persistence of 
transfers. That is, some families may be more connected than others and parents of these families 
may transfer to children regularly over time.  Others may give money to children episodically.  
To conduct an analysis of persistence, we restrict the sample by cohort to households that are 
present in all possible waves. Thus the analysis is representative of this particular sub-sample, 
which is on average healthier and wealthier than the full sample.  
There is a lot of heterogeneity in the regularity of transfers to children across households 
and cohorts (Table 4).  Among respondents in the 1923 and earlier birth cohorts, 35 percent did 
not give transfers in any wave and only 2 percent gave in all seven waves demonstrating more 
persistence in not giving than in giving.  
The younger cohorts compared to the older cohort tend to give more equally over time.  
For example, for the 1942 to 1947 birth cohort the percent giving in any number of waves is 
almost equal with only about 7 percent less giving in all waves compared to never giving (19 
percent and 12 percent respectively).  The 1948 to 1953 birth cohorts are striking with 35 percent 
never giving and 35 percent giving in both waves.  This difference in giving over time by cohort 
may suggest that we need to look at difference in the children of these cohorts to understand 
giving behavior of parents.  For example, if parents in the youngest birth cohorts are giving to 
help with a down payment for a house, we may expect this pattern as multiple ‘young’ children   16 
age through the purchase of their first home.  The children of the older cohorts may have less 
age-related expected need but parents may give in response to unexpected events.  
To further explore and describe the heterogeneity of giving over time, we estimate 
models of the probability of transfers in one wave as a function of all lead and lags of cash 
transfers by cohort.   For the 1931-1941 and 1923 and earlier birth cohorts entering in 1992 and 
1992 respectively, we estimate the probability of giving in year 2000 as a function of giving in 
all lead and lag years.  For the 1942 to 1947 and 1924 to 1930 birth cohorts entering in 1998, we 
estimate the probability of transfers in year 2002 as a function of whether the household gave a 
financial transfer in 1998 and/or 2004 and 2006. With only two waves of data for the 1948-1953 
birth cohort, we do not estimate the probability of giving.  
Figure 2 shows thirty-seven percent of households in the 1931 – 1941 birth cohort give to 
children in 2000.  The probability of giving in 2000 conditional on not giving in any other wave 
is 0.09. On the other hand, if a household gave in 1998, the probability the household gives in 
2000 is 0.30.  Going back another wave, giving in 1996 and in no other wave implies a 0.17 
probability of giving in 2000 and is substantially lower than if the household gave in 1998.  The 
further in time from year 2000, the lower is the probability of giving in that year.  Looking 
forward to years 2000 and 2002, we find symmetry in the results although imperfect.  The 
probability of giving money to children in 2000, given a transfer two years later is 0.27-- 
remarkably similar to the results for 1998.  Giving in 2000 for those who also gave four years 
later is 0.17 – the identical effect of giving 4 years earlier.  The more waves in which a 
household gives, the more likely is the household to give in 2000.  Figure 3 illustrates the results 
of the probability of giving in 2000 as a function of all leads and lags for the 1923 and earlier 
cohort.  The pattern and magnitude is similar to that of the 1931-1941 cohort with lower   17 
probabilities with successive years away from 2000 and relative symmetry between lead and lag 
years.  The results for the other cohorts are similar and figures are available upon request.  
The pattern of giving over time of the birth cohort groups is consistent with giving in 
response to an expected or unexpected change in need of a child.  The persistence in both giving 
and not giving suggests that some families are ‘givers’ others are not.   
4.  Econometric Specification and Results 
We use multivariate regression to estimate the effect of age and other donor 
characteristics predicted by a life-cycle model to influence giving behavior on parents’ transfers 
to children.  As described in Section 2, we expect the behavior of singles and couples to be 
different and thus we estimate the model separately for each group. We allow transfers to be a 
non-linear function of age.  The precise age pattern of transfers is unknown however we expect it 
to be non-linear with declines accelerating at older ages based on simulations from Hurd and 
Smith (2002). Financial resources, enter in the models as income and wealth quartiles.   
We include a measure of mortality risk, calculated as the deviation of self-reported 
subjective survival 10 to 19 more years and 20 to 29 more years from survival probabilities 
based on age, race and sex specific life-tables.
10  Given that we control for survival variation due 
to age and sex, we interpret the deviation as information about survival known to the individual 
but unobservable to the econometrician. For couples, each spouse’s survival expectation is 
included in the model. Risk aversion (a separate measure for each spouse) is included in the 
model.  Our risk aversion measure is based on a respondent’s response to the choice between 
pairs of jobs where one guarantees current family income and the other offers a chance to 
increase income but also carries the risk of loss of income.  The resulting measure of risk 
                                                 
10Data source for life tables is found at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr56/nvsr56_09.pdf   18 
aversion is a one to four scale with four indicating the most risk averse.
11  Other measures are 
included that we expect to vary by cohort and affect transfers.  The number of children of the 
parents is included as indicators for one child, two to four children and five or more children.  
We also include indicators for years of schooling and birth cohort to control for other 
unobservable cohort differences.  
Also included in the model is the onset of acute events (heart attack, stroke, cancer), 
onset of chronic diseases (diabetes, lung, arthritis) and onset of a new difficulty with an activity 
of daily living (ADL).  These health conditions are another source of heterogeneity that likely 
affect giving to children.  If poor health proxies for elevated mortality risk, then transfers will be 
higher among those with a lower survival probability. We examine the hypothesis that onset of 
disability or a health shock may induce transfers because of a change in mortality risk.  An 
alternative explanation would be that transfers increase because care-giving help is needed and 
transfers are acting as payment for services. Alternatively, poor health may negatively impact the 
marginal utility of transfers resulting in lower financial transfers. Moreover, poor health and 
illness may lead to higher medical expenditures or expectations of increases in future medical 
expenditures and thus would have a negative effect on transfers.   Thus, the overall effect of a 
decline in health status on transfers is an empirical question.  Finally, we also include the receipt 
of a lump sum amount through insurance, other legal settlement, or inheritance.  While not 
exogenous shocks to income, the timing of the receipt of this income may be unexpected.    
Appendix table A shows the means and standard deviations of these variables for singles 
and couples (average across both spouses) respectively. As expected, singles are older and have 
                                                 
11 The ‘income gamble’ questions are only asked among workers.  We carry-forward the initial 
response for respondents that retire between waves.     19 
less income and wealth than couples. All underestimate their additional years survival rates 
compared to life tables but couples more than singles for the 10 to 19 years deviation from life 
tables. Couples are more likely to be in the highest risk-aversion category than singles.  It may be 
that risk averse individuals are more likely to marry and stay married.  
Given the significant fraction of non-giving households (64 percent), and data patterns 
that suggest differences in behavior between giving and not giving compared to amount 
conditional on giving a transfer, we first estimate the probability that a financial transfer is 
positive, and second the log value of the financial transfer conditional on giving money to 
children of $500 or more. Our analysis of transfers over time suggests that there are likely 
unobserved differences among families in transfer behavior.  Some families are closer and more 
caring than others and transfers are more frequent and larger.   Suppose our model is: 
Tit =! +"1Ageit +"2Age!squaredit +"3FinResourcesit +"4MortalityRiskit +"5Riski +#i +$it 
Where εit is the random error and αi is the unobserved heterogeneity.  The panel data 
allow us to deal with unobserved heterogeneity and consistently estimate β. Using a random 

























The covariates in our model (e.g. financial resources, mortality risk, risk aversion etc.) 
are given by Xit.  Assuming Xit and αi are uncorrelated, a random effects estimator produces 
consistent and efficient estimates of β using the information from changes from the average 
value of X and variation across households.  This analysis offers several analytical advantages 
over a cross-sectional approach including the ability to better control for unobserved   20 
heterogeneity.  In addition, we use the long data panel to examine how changes over waves, such 
as onset of a health condition, and the arrival of a lump sum on income affect transfer behavior.   
GLS Results by Marital Status.  Tables 5 and 6 show estimation results from a GLS 
estimator for singles and couples respectively.  Ordinary least squares results are provided in the 
appendix. Model (2) is the same as Model (1) with the addition of wealth and income quartile 
interactions with age and age-squared. The life-cycle model predicts that higher wealth will lead 
to greater transfers the older the age of the parent.  Moreover, holding wealth constant we 
examine whether age patterns of transfers among wealthy couples is due to a changing sample of 
couples over time as the less wealthy (and healthy) couples become singles through widowing.  
Singles.  The first column of results in Table 5 shows, for a sample of singles, GLS 
estimates of the probability of making a transfer to children (Model 1).  Our estimate of the 
fraction of the variation due to αi is 0.26 suggesting an important role for heterogeneity in 
explaining the likelihood of giving money to children. There is a 15 percentage point (40 
percent) difference in giving for parents in the lowest wealth quartile and the highest, and a 17 
percentage point (43 percent) difference for parents in the lowest income quartile and the 
highest. Having received a lump sum of income (insurance, other legal settlement, or 
inheritance) in the last two years increases the probability of a transfers by almost 5 percentage 
points which is consistent with expectations that financial resources (possibly unexpected in 
terms of timing) lead to increases in giving.  The effects of mortality risk and risk aversion are in 
the expected direction, but the magnitude is small and not statistically different than zero.  
Looking to our estimates of the effects of health, the onset of a new ADL limitations or 
acute condition are associated with increases in the likelihood of giving money to children. This 
positive relationship may be driven by an increase in mortality risk or payment of care giving   21 
services from children or even payment of health expenses by children.  Unlike the onset of 
disability of acute condition, the onset of a new chronic condition is associated with a small 
decline in the likelihood money is given.  It may be that chronic conditions have a smaller effect 
on mortality and the need for care than acute conditions or disability onset and instead have a 
larger affect on the marginal utility of transfers thus decreasing the probability of a transfer.   The 
likelihood of transfers may decline due to future expected increases in medical expenditures.    
The results for amount of money (log value) given by single parents, conditional on 
giving are also shown in Table 5 (Amt M1). Our estimate of the fraction of the variation due to 
αi is 0.28 suggesting a similar role for heterogeneity in the amount given and the probability of 
giving.  Wealth and income again have large effects on transfers.  In contrast to the model for the 
probability of giving, the effects of wealth are substantially larger than those of income. There is 
a 72 percent difference in the amount given for a parent in the lowest wealth quartile and the 
highest, and a 44 percent difference for a parent in the lowest income quartile and the highest.  A 
lump sum cash receipt increases the amount of money given to children by 15 percent.  
Consistent with the expectations of a life cycle model, expectations of a long life decrease the 
amount of money given by 14 percent and a highly risk averse parent gives 8 percent less than 
one that is less risk averse.  Among the onset of health condition variables, only the onset of an 
acute disease increases transfers and it does so by 13 percent.  
Figure 4 shows simulated age effects from Model (1) for the probability of a transfer and 
the amount.  For singles, the probability a parent gives money declines approximately linearly 
with age from 0.37 to 0.17.  The amount of money a single parent gives to children, conditional 
on giving declines until age 75 and then rises just slightly.  Figure 5 shows simulated age effects 
from Model 2 for both the probability of a transfer and the amount, conditional on giving at least   22 
$500 to children. The probability of giving money declines fairly linearly for both high and low 
wealth singles with the probability of giving everywhere higher for high wealth singles.  The 
amount of money declines slightly for low wealth singles until about age 75 and then begins to 
rise and is essentially flat for high wealth singles.  
In sum, the results demonstrate that the predictions from a simple theoretical dynamic 
model that treats amount of money given to children as a consumption item is broadly consistent 
with the empirical findings on the amount of money single parents give children. The estimates 
also suggest substantial heterogeneity in giving unexplained by these observable characteristics.  
Couples.  The first column of results in Table 6 shows, for a sample of couples, GLS 
estimates of the probability of making a transfer to children (M1).  Our estimate of the fraction of 
the variation due to αi is 0.35 suggesting a larger role for heterogeneity for couples compared to 
singles.  We find smaller wealth and income effects for couples than for singles on the 
probability of giving money to children.   There is an 8 percentage point difference in giving for 
parents in the lowest wealth quartile and the highest, and a 14 percentage point difference for 
parents in the lowest income quartile and the highest. The estimate for having received a lump 
sum of income in the last two years is consistent with expectations and increases the probability 
of giving money by 2.4 percentage points. Being in the most risk averse category is associated 
with a decline in the probability of making a transfer to children for wives but there is no effect 
for husbands and expectations of a longer life increase transfers.  That is, the results for singles 
display consistency with the predictions of our model, however the estimates for couples do not.  
A lifecycle of model describes financial giving to children but incompletely. There remains a 
large role for household-specific heterogeneity in explaining the giving behavior of parents, with 
observable factors only explaining a part of giving behavior.   23 
Looking to our estimates of health, onset of a new ADL increases transfers by 1.1 and 1.5 
percentage points for men and women respectively.  Onset of an acute condition (men only) 
increases the likelihood of transfers by almost 2 percentage points. The results are similar to the 
estimates for single parents and consistent with the hypothesis that a health shock increases 
mortality risk and thus transfers or money given is payment for services from children.  
The results for amount of money given by couples, conditional on giving are also shown 
in Table 6. Our estimate of the fraction of the variation due to αi is 0.47 suggesting a large role 
of heterogeneity for couples compared to singles and for amount of money compared to the 
probability of giving money.  Wealth and income again have large effects on transfers. There is a 
45 percent difference in the amount given for parents in the lowest wealth quartile and the 
highest, and a 26 percent difference for parents in the lowest income quartile and the highest.  As 
we found for the likelihood of giving, these effects are smaller than for singles.   
The effect of a lump sum cash receipt is also positive and smaller than the effect for 
singles (13 percent increase).  Expectations of a long life and high risk aversion are associated 
with a small decline in giving as predicted by the model but are not statistically different than 
zero. Taken together, the effect of onset of a negative health condition on money is positive 
although the gender differences for married couples and by condition suggest further study is 
need to fully understand the behavioral response to health shocks. 
Figure 6 shows simulated age effects from Model (1) for the probability of a transfer and 
the amount.  For couples, the probability a parent gives money declines approximately linearly 
with age from 0.44 to 0.22.  The amount of money a couple gives to children, conditional on 
giving initially declines until age 68 and then begins to rise.  We examine the extent to which 
this rise in the amount of money given is driven by couples with high wealth that may be   24 
substituting bequests with gifts of money to children while they are alive.  The data, however, do 
not support this hypothesis. The probability of giving money declines fairly linearly for both 
high and low wealth couples (Figure 7).  The amount of money declines slightly more rapidly for 
low wealth couples than for high wealth couples however the age patterns are similar with 
decreasing then increasing transfers with age. For low wealth (high wealth) couples the amount 
of money given to children declines until age 70 (65) and then begins to rise. There is the 
expected level difference in giving between low and high wealth couples.  
In sum, the estimation results for singles and couples show that a lifecycle of model 
provides a good framework for understanding the amount of money given to children by single 
parents but less so for couples.  That is, the model is useful for understanding giving to children 
but incomplete. There remains a large role for household-specific heterogeneity in explaining the 
giving behavior of parents, with observable factors only explaining a part of giving behavior. 
6.  Conclusions 
This study increases our understanding of family transfer behavior over a part of the 
lifecycle by analyzing the scale of giving, how regular it is over time, and the factors that shape 
it.  Over one-third of parents give money to children. Parents, who give money to children over a 
two-year period, give just over $14,000.  Giving is highly unequal. At the median, the amount 
transferred to children is zero and at the 95
th percentile, cash transfers are $24,000. Linking data 
on the money given by parents to children over time, we calculate that ‘rest of lifetime’ 
intervivos giving by parents children is about $50,000 to their adult children from their early 50’s 
to death.  Taken together with expected bequests (Hurd and Smith, 2002) parents from the birth 
cohort 1923 and earlier give close to $90,000 on average (discounted expected value) to their 
children from ages 75 until death, which is 30 percent of age 75 wealth. Using longitudinal data,   25 
we are able to examine age patterns in transfers parsing out cohort effects.  Cross-tabulations of 
transfers by age revealed that the probability of giving money to children declines with age but 
the amount of money increases.  We find that the increasing amount with age is due to both 
difference in giving behavior by cohort and by whether the parent is single or in a couple.  
Indeed, we find that for singles, the probability a parent gives money and the amount of money 
given declines with age.  
These averages, however, do not reveal the enormous variation in giving by households 
over time. Some parents give to their children others never give.  The younger cohorts compared 
to the older cohort tend to give more equally over time. The children of the younger cohorts are 
more likely to have age-related expected needs for transfers for example for education and to 
purchase a home than children from the older cohorts.  As the children age through these events, 
a pattern of equal percentages of households giving in one, two or three (etc.) waves emerges.  
The probability of giving in a particular wave conditional on giving in a prior wave declines as 
you move away in time from the wave consistent with giving in response to an expected or 
unexpected change in need of children.  The persistence in not giving shows that some families 
are ‘givers of money’ and others are not. 
Another advantage of longitudinal data is the ability to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity. We estimate models assuming random effects and find a large fraction of the 
variation of giving can be attributed to a household specific effect.  For singles, just under one-
third of the variation in giving is due to household specific heterogeneity while for couples, the 
fraction of variation due to household heterogeneity is over one-third for the probability of 
giving and over one-half for the amount given.     26 
Consistent with a life-cycle model, we find the amount a single parent gives to children 
declines with age, risk aversion and mortality risk and rises with economic resources.  Flat or 
increasing transfers is consistent with a model for couples and empirical findings suggest that 
this is true for consumption and is consistent with our findings of rising transfers with age for 
couples.  The results for mortality risk and risk aversion do not conform with expectations for 
couples suggesting that to better understand giving over time for couples we may have to look to 
the children and their circumstances.  
Also pointing to the importance of the characteristics and behavior of children in 
understanding a parent’s giving behavior is the general finding of an increase in transfers in 
response to the onset of a negative health condition.  These findings are consistent with 
‘purchases’ of services from children or new information related to the parent’s expected 
lifespan but to interpret the findings will require additional research on the care giving provided 
by children in response to a parent’s health shock as well as changes in medical expenditures; a 
subject of future research.     
The behavioral response to changes in economic circumstances may indicate that in times 
of economic downturn, such as that being experienced by many households at the end of 2008, 
parents may respond with fewer transfers to their children thus limiting the role of parents as 
insurance against the shocks experienced by children.  Of course the response is likely to vary 
across households and by the impact of the downturn on the young generation relative to the old 
generation.   
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Figure 1 – Probability Financial Transfers Given to Children by Parent’s Age and Birth Cohort 
 
 
SOURCE:  Author’s calculations based on 1992-2006 HRS 
NOTE:  Sample is households with children or step-children.  Cohort birth year is randomly 
chosen among birth years of couples. Data weighted using HRS household analysis weights 
structured to match the CPS. 
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Figure 2 – Probability of Giving Financial Transfers in 2000 By Giving in Lead and Lag 
Years:  HRS Sample Cohort 
 
 
SOURCE:  Author’s calculations based on 1992-2006 HRS 
NOTE:  Sample is birth cohort 1931-1941 households with children or step-children and present 
in all eight waves.  
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Figure 3 – Probability of Giving Financial Transfers in 2000 By Giving in Lead and Lag Years:  




SOURCE:  Author’s calculations based on 1993-2006 HRS 
NOTE:  Sample is birth cohort 1923 or before, households with children or step-children and 
present in all seven possible waves. 
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SOURCE: Simulated predictions from GLS model of transfers based on 1992-2006 HRS 
NOTE:  Sample is singles with children or step-children. Transfer amounts are CPI adjusted.  
Data weighted using HRS household analysis weights structured to match the CPS. Effects of 
covariates excluding age and age-squared are calculated at the mean. Predicted probability is 
given on the left-side y-axis and ln($ amount) is given on the right-side y-axis 
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SOURCE: Simulated predictions from GLS model of transfers based on 1992-2006 HRS 
NOTE:  Sample is singles with children or step-children. Transfer amounts are CPI adjusted.  
Data weighted using HRS household analysis weights structured to match the CPS. Effects of 
covariates excluding age and age-squared are calculated at the mean. Predicted probability is 
given on the left-side y-axis and ln($ amount) is given on the right-side y-axis. 
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SOURCE: Simulated predictions from GLS model of transfers based on 1992-2006 HRS 
NOTE:  Sample is singles with children or step-children. Transfer amounts are CPI adjusted.  
Data weighted using HRS household analysis weights structured to match the CPS. Effects of 
covariates excluding age and age-squared are calculated at the mean. Predicted probability is 
given on the left-side y-axis and ln($ amount) is given on the right-side y-axis. 
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SOURCE: Simulated predictions from GLS model of transfers based on 1992-2006 HRS 
NOTE:  Sample is singles with children or step-children. Transfer amounts are CPI adjusted.  
Data weighted using HRS household analysis weights structured to match the CPS. Effects of 
covariates excluding age and age-squared are calculated at the mean. Predicted probability is 
given on the left-side y-axis and ln($ amount) is given on the right-side y-axis. 
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Table 1 – Household Sample Characteristics:  Income, Wealth, Number of Children 
 
      Income     Wealth     No. of Kids 
Cohort  Obs.  Mean ($)  Median ($)  Mean ($)  Median ($)  Mean 
1923 
earlier 
22,247    32,988    20,858    308,133    128,628   3.15 
1924-1930  11,967    43,613    28,098    393,469    168,623   3.65 
1931-1941  38,641    64,215    40,976    423,612    165,000   3.55 
1942-1947  10,120    84,957    57,820    424,967    154,187   3.13 
1948-1953   5,508    103,967    66,098    428,607    153,500   2.97 
Total  88,483    63,155    36,963    395,685    153,467   3.34 
SOURCE:  Author’s calculations based on 1992-2006 HRS 
NOTE:  Sample is households with children or step-children.  Cohort birth year is randomly 
chosen among birth years of couples.  Household income and household wealth (financial and 
housing) are CPI adjusted.  Data weighted using HRS household analysis weights structured to 
match the CPS. 
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Table 2 – Distribution of Amount of Money Given to Children by Parent’s Birth Cohort 
  Transfers Amount ($) 














10  0  0  0  0  0  0 
25  0  0  0  0  0  0 
50  0  0  0  0  0  500 
75  2,474  560  1,067  2,570  4,000  5,000 
90  11,707  8,000  8,538  11,564  13,603  18,000 
95  24,000  21,345  21,000  22,412  25,756  32,017 
99  70,244  80,000  70,244  66,000  68,025  85,379 
Mean  5,124  5,168  4,553  4,735  5,417  6,430 
Prob. Give   0.36    0.26    0.28    0.37    0.46    0.51  
No. Obs.   88,483    22,247    11,967    38,641    10,120    5,508  
        














10   1,028    1,067    937    1,113    1,000    1,000  
25   2,000    2,000    1,855    2,000    2,000    2,000  
50   4,947    5,336    4,947    5,000    4,500    5,000  
75   12,849    16,008    13,000    12,807    12,000    13,000  
90   30,837    40,342    35,122    28,738    27,210    32,000  
95   50,500    66,142    58,272    47,611    44,265    48,000  
99   125,300    200,000    190,506    109,216    100,000    120,000  
Mean   14,051    20,226    16,003    12,958    11,759    12,730  
No. Obs.   29,198    5,168    3,455    13,456    4,525    2,594  
 
SOURCE:  Author’s calculations based on 1992-2006 HRS 
NOTE:  Sample is households with children or step-children.  Sample sizes differ slightly from 
Table 1 due to missing observations on transfer data.  Cohort birth year is randomly chosen 
among birth years of couples.  Transfer amounts are CPI adjusted.  Data weighted using HRS 
household analysis weights structured to match the CPS. 
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Gave $500 or More to 
Children 




Obs  All  Single  Married  All  Single  Married 
less 55  14,133   0.49  0.43  0.51   6,326    4,470    6,974  
56-60  15,691   0.43  0.35  0.47   5,164    3,280    6,174  
61-65  14,628   0.36  0.31  0.4   4,703    3,381    5,462  
66-70  11,028   0.32  0.28  0.35   4,333    3,966    4,568  
71-75  11,132   0.29  0.25  0.32   4,735    4,418    5,054  
76-80   9,316   0.27  0.24  0.31   4,372    3,980    4,972  
81-85   6,918   0.26  0.24  0.32   4,718    3,405    8,090  
86+   5,637   0.2  0.19  0.25   5,997    5,968    6,155  
 
SOURCE:  Author’s calculations based on 1992-2006 HRS 
NOTE:  Sample is households with children or step-children. Data weighted using HRS 
household analysis weights structured to match the CPS. 
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Table 4–Distribution of Giving Across Time by Sample Cohort 
Waves Gave  AHEAD  CODA  HRS  War Babies 
Early Baby 
Boomers 
0  35.33  40.82  20.88  19.13  35.18 
1  17.75  19.39  15.28  16.10  29.33 
2  13.93  14.90  13.26  17.61  35.49 
3  10.56  11.22  11.23  17.05  X 
4  8.90  8.16  11.13  18.18  X 
5  6.79  5.51  10.12  11.93  X 
6  4.62  X  7.87  X  X 
7  2.11  X  6.34  X  X 
8  X  X  3.88  X  X 
Total  100%  100%  100%  100%  100% 
No. of Obs  1,752  980  4,051  1,056  1,609 
SOURCE:  Author’s calculations based on 1992-2006 HRS 
NOTE:  Sample is respondents with children or step-children and present in all possible survey 
waves. 
     40 
Table 5–GLS Model of Probability of Making Inter-vivos Financial Transfers:  Singles 
  Prob. 1    Prob. 2    Amt. 1    Amt. 2   
Covariate (excluded)  Coef.    Coef.    Coef.    Coef.   
Age  -0.011  **  -0.007    -0.079  **  -0.063   
Age-squared  0.00004  *  0.000005    0.0005  **  0.0005   
Male  0.058  **  0.060  **  0.150  **  0.146  ** 
Marital (Divorced):                 
Widowed  0.014  **  0.014  **  0.165  **  0.158  ** 
Never Married  -0.019    -0.014    -0.004    -0.029   
Yrs. Educ (12 yrs):                 
<12 years  -0.052  **  -0.052  **  -0.060  **  -0.051   
12-15 years  0.053  **  0.052  **  0.072  **  0.073  ** 
16+ years  0.123  **  0.122  **  0.336  **  0.337  ** 
Wealth Quartiles (Q3):                 
Q1  -0.087  **  -0.094  **  -0.334  **  0.983   
Q2  -0.032  **  0.004  **  -0.209  **  0.520   
Q4  0.065  **  -0.198  **         
Income Q (Q3):                 
Q1  -0.099  **  -0.116  **  -0.173  **  0.942   
Q2  -0.060  **  0.003  **  -0.073  **  1.109   
Q4  0.068  **  0.367  **  0.269  **  1.475   
Wealth Q*Age:                 
Q1*Age      -0.001        -0.037   
Q2*Age      -0.001        -0.019   
Q4*Age      0.008        0.028   
Income Q*Age:                  
Q1*Age      -0.001        -0.022   
Q2*Age      -0.003        -0.027   
Q4*Age      -0.008        -0.039   
Wealth Q*Age-2:                 
Q1*Age-squared      0.00002        0.0002   
Q2*Age-squared      0.00001        0.0001   
Q4*Age-squared      -0.00005        -0.0002   
Income Q*Age2:                  
Q1*Age-squared      0.00002        0.0001   
Q2*Age-squared      0.00003        0.0001   
Q4*Age-squared      0.00006        0.0003   
Lump income   0.048  **  0.047  **  0.145  **  0.147  ** 
Survival 10-19 yrs
a  -0.003    -0.004    -0.139  **  -0.135  ** 
Most risk averse  -0.006    -0.005    -0.075  **  -0.079  ** 
Table continued on next page. 
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Table 5 cont.–GLS Model of Probability of Making Inter-vivos Financial Transfers:  Singles 
 
  Prob. M1    Prob. 
M2    Amt. M1    Amt. M2   
  Coef.    Coef.    Coef.    Coef.   
Health:                 
ADL limitation onset  0.014  **  0.014  **  0.020    0.022   
Acute illness onset  0.023  **  0.024  **  0.126  **  0.126  ** 
Chronic cond. onset  -0.010    -0.010    0.001    -0.0004   
Birth cohort (<=1923):                 
1924-1930 birth cohort  -0.022  **  -0.024  **  -0.146  **  -0.145  ** 
1931-1941 birth cohort  -0.032  **  -0.035  **  -0.302  **  -0.300  ** 
1942-1947 birth cohort  -0.002    -0.006    -0.427  **  -0.423  ** 
1948-1953 birth cohort  0.020    0.020    -0.439  **  -0.437  ** 
Constant  0.879  **  0.776  **  11.000  **  10.283  ** 
No. observations  39,467     39,467     10,231    10,231   
Fraction variation due ai   0.261      0.260     0.276    0.275   
R-squared:  within   0.009      0.009     0.019    0.020   
R-squared:  between   0.236      0.237     0.192    0.194   
R-squared:  overall   0.150       0.151      0.166     0.169    
SOURCE:  Author’s calculations based on 1992-2006 HRS 
NOTE:  Sample is singles with children or step-children. Excluded categories in parenthesis.  
Wealth and income quartiles defined over the sample of couples.  Transfer amounts are CPI 
adjusted.  Models also include missing indicators for: highest degree, respondent’s (spouse’s) 
deviation of survival probability from life tables and risk aversion.  Robust standard errors. ‘a’ 
indicates coefficient value multiplied by 100. 
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Table 6–GLS Models of Probability of Making Inter-vivos Financial Transfers:  Couples 
  Prob. 1    Prob.2    Amt. 1    Amt. 2   
Covariates (omitted)  Coef.    Coef.    Coef.    Coef.   
Age (male)  -0.002    -0.010    -0.043  **  0.030   
Age-squared (male)  -0.00001    0.0001    0.0003  **  -0.0004  * 
Age (female)  0.0007    0.005    -0.057  **  -0.124  ** 
Age-squared (female)  -0.00002    -0.0001    0.0005  **  0.0011  ** 
Educ. Yrs. male (12)                 
<12 years  -0.045  **  -0.046  **  -0.045    -0.043   
12-15 years  0.034  **  0.033  **  0.015    0.015   
16+ years  0.055  **  0.055  **  0.307  **  0.307  ** 
Educ. Yrs. female (12)                 
<12 years  -0.060  **  -0.059  **  -0.039    -0.034   
12-15 years  0.027  **  0.026  **  0.012    0.013   
16+ years  0.099  **  0.099  **  0.260  **  0.260  ** 
Wealth Q (Q3):                 
Q1  -0.059  **  -0.342  *  -0.261  **  0.465   
Q2  -0.007  **  -0.096    -0.105  **  -0.660   
Q4  0.019  **  -0.176    0.190  **  -1.133   
Income Q (Q3):                 
Q1  -0.085  **  -0.360  *  -0.140  **  -0.519   
Q2  -0.035  **  -0.086    -0.095  **  0.001   
Q4  0.052  **  0.053    0.116  **  2.087  ** 
Wlth Q*Age (males):                 
Q1*Age      0.019  **      -0.053  ** 
Q2*Age      0.009        -0.019   
Q4*Age      0.008        -0.003   
Inc Q*Age (males):                   
Q1*Age      -0.003        -0.058  ** 
Q2*Age      0.001        -0.044  * 
Q4*Age      0.001        -0.114  ** 
Wlth Q*Age
2 (males):                   
Q1*Age-squared      -0.00014  **      0.0005  ** 
Q2*Age-squared      -0.00006        0.0002   
Q4*Age-squared      -0.00006        0.0001   
Inc Q*Age
2 (males):                   
Q1*Age-squared      0.00002        0.00047  ** 
Q2*Age-squared      0.000003        0.00041  ** 
Q4*Age-squared      -0.00003        0.00094  ** 
Wlth Q*Age (females):                 
Q1*Age      -0.011  **      0.036   
Q2*Age      -0.007        0.042  ** 
Q4*Age      -0.004        0.040   
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Table 6 cont.–GLS Models of Inter-vivos Financial Transfers:  Couples 
 
Prob. 
M1    Prob. M2    Amt. 
M1    Amt. M2   
  Coef.    Coef.    Coef.    Coef.   
Inc Q*Age (females):                 
Q1*Age      0.011  **      0.071  ** 
Q2*Age      -0.0002        0.042  ** 
Q4*Age      0.00003        0.051  ** 
Wlth Q*Age
2 (female):                 
Q1*Age-squared      0.00010  **      -0.00042  ** 
Q2*Age-squared      0.00005        -0.00046  ** 
Q4*Age-squared      0.00004        -0.00035  ** 
Inc Q*Age
2 (female):                   
Q1*Age-squared      -0.000085  **      -0.00057  ** 
Q2*Age-squared      -0.000008        -0.00041  ** 
Q4*Age-squared      0.000007        -0.00045  ** 
Lump sum income   0.024  **  0.025  **  0.126  **  0.128  ** 
Survival 10-19 (males)
a  0.018  **  0.018  **  -0.016    -0.015   
Survival 10-19 (female)
a  0.038  **  0.038  **  -0.009    -0.012   
Most risk averse (males)  -0.005    -0.005    -0.035    -0.039   
Most risk averse (female)  -0.016  **  -0.016  **  -0.020    -0.023   
Health/Disab. (males):                 
ADL limitation onset  0.011  *  0.010  *  0.019    0.020   
Acute illness onset  0.017  **  0.016  **  -0.068  **  -0.068  ** 
Chronic condition onset  0.002    0.002    -0.003    -0.001   
Health/Disab. (females):                     
ADL limitation onset  0.015  **  0.014  **  -0.025    -0.022   
Acute illness onset  0.006    0.006    0.007    0.005   
Chronic condition onset  -0.001    -0.001    0.042  **  0.042  * 
Birth cohort (<=1923)                 
1924-1930 birth cohort  -0.021  **  -0.021  **  -0.088  **  -0.093  ** 
1931-1941 birth cohort  -0.034  **  -0.034  **  -0.161  **  -0.166  ** 
1942-1947 birth cohort  -0.029  **  -0.029  **  -0.226  **  -0.231  ** 
1948-1953 birth cohort  -0.016    -0.016  *  -0.333  **  -0.336  ** 
Constant  0.678  **  0.838  *  11.822  **  11.594  ** 
Number of observations  95,652    95,652    37,218    37,218   
Fraction variation due ai  0.350    0.350    0.465     0.465   
R-squared:  within  0.011    0.011    0.032     0.034   
R-squared:  between  0.207    0.209    0.188     0.188   
R-squared:  overall  0.106     0.107    0.136     0.137    
SOURCE:  Author’s calculations based on 1992-2006 HRS. Sample: couples kids/step. 
NOTE: Wealth and income quartiles for couple sample.  Transfer amounts are CPI adjusted.  
Models include missing indicators and number of kids. Robust standard errors. ‘a’ indicates 
coefficient value multiplied by 100.  
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Appendix Table A: Sample Characteristics 
 
  Singles    Couples   
  Mean  Std. 
Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Age  71.21  11.52  63.489  9.811 
Male  0.229  0.420  na  na 
Widowed  0.648  0.478  na  na 
Divorced  0.324  0.468  na  na 
Never married  0.026  0.158  na  na 
Years of education  11.27  3.48  12.27  3.24 
Number of children  3.34  2.13  3.60  2.10 
Financial and housing wealth  192,667  774,735  471,553  1,492,725 
Household income  28,313  63,777  76,128  172,754 
Received lump sum income 
(2yrs)  0.057  0.232  0.065  0.246 
Self-reported poor health  0.136  0.343  0.0745  0.263 
ADL limitation new onset  0.140  0.347  0.063  0.2425 
Acute condition new onset  0.074  0.261  0.052  0.220 
Chronic condition new onset  0.097  0.296  0.081  0.272 
Survival 10-19 years deviation  -1.592  27.481  -3.539  23.889 
Survival 20-29 years deviation  -7.746  9.383  -7.567  12.254 
Most risk averse  0.365  0.481  0.518  0.499 
1923 or earlier birth cohort  0.391  0.488  0.139  0.346 
1924-1930 birth cohort  0.119  0.324  0.149  0.356 
1931-1941 birth cohort  0.386  0.487  0.477  0.499 
1942-1947 birth cohort  0.066  0.248  0.153  0.360 
1948-1953 birth cohort  0.038  0.191  0.082  0.274 
Ln(Transfer amount)  8.442  1.329  8.597  1.291 
Probability of transfer  0.259  0.438  0.389  0.488 
No. of Observations  39,467    95,652   
SOURCE:  Author’s calculations based on 1992-2006 HRS 
NOTE:  Sample is single parents with children or step-children. 
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Appendix Table B–OLS Models of Inter-vivos Financial Transfers:  Singles 
   Probability  Ln(Amt>$500) 
  Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err. 
Age  -0.007  0.004  -0.105  0.022 
(Age)
2  0.00003  0.00002  0.0007  0.0002 
Male  0.056  0.007  0.163  0.033 
Marital status:           
(Divorced)           
Widowed  0.011  0.008  0.144  0.037 
Never married  -0.018  0.016  -0.021  0.091 
Education:           
<12 years  -0.040  0.007  -0.046  0.041 
(12 years)           
12-15 years  0.048  0.010  0.091  0.039 
16+ years  0.108  0.012  0.326  0.044 
Number of Kids:           
(1)           
2-4  0.003  0.008  0.212  0.039 
5 or more  -0.009  0.009  0.191  0.051 
Wealth Quartiles:           
Q1  -0.087  0.007  -0.343  0.039 
Q2  -0.036  0.007  -0.224  0.037 
(Q3)           
Q4  0.079  0.008  0.449  0.041 
Income Quartiles:           
Q1  -0.118  0.007  -0.176  0.038 
Q2  -0.073  0.007  -0.077  0.037 
(Q3)           
Q4  0.092  0.008  0.327  0.039 
Survival 10-19 years
a  -0.012  0.009  -0.192  0.053 
Most risk averse  -0.002  0.008  0.006  0.100 
Birth Cohort:      -0.062  0.034 
(1923 or earlier)           
1924-1930 birth cohort  -0.015  0.011       
1931-1941 birth cohort  -0.013  0.013  -0.170  0.064 
1942-1947 birth cohort  0.025  0.018  -0.418  0.072 
1948-1953 birth cohort  0.056  0.021  -0.651  0.089 
Constant  0.693  0.137  -0.659  0.095 
Number of observations  39467     10,231    
R-squared  0.151     0.160    
SOURCE:  Author’s calculations based on 1992-2006 HRS 
NOTE:  Sample is single parents with children or step-children. Excluded categories in 
parenthesis.  Wealth and income quartiles defined over the sample of singles.  Transfer amounts 
are CPI adjusted.  Models also include missing indicators for: highest degree, respondent’s 
(spouse’s) deviation of survival probability from life tables and risk aversion.  Robust standard 
errors. ‘a’ indicates coefficient value multiplied by 100.   46 
 
Appendix Table C–OLS Models of Inter-vivos Financial Transfers:  Couples 
  Probability     Ln(Amt>$500) 
  Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err. 
Age (male)  0.0004  0.0044  -0.059  0.018 
Age-squared (male)  -0.00001  0.00003  0.0004  0.0001 
Age (female)  -0.0017  0.0032  -0.045  0.014 
Age-squared (female)  0.0000003  0.0000258  0.0003  0.0001 
Yrs. Educ (males) [12yrs]           
<12 years  -0.032  0.009  -0.046  0.034 
12-15 years  0.024  0.010  0.008  0.032 
16+ years  0.031  0.010  0.184  0.033 
Yrs. Educ (females)[12yrs]           
<12 years  -0.046  0.009  0.024  0.035 
12-15 years  0.028  0.009  0.013  0.029 
16+ years  0.090  0.011  0.232  0.034 
Number of Kids[1]:           
2-4  0.031  0.011  0.167  0.039 
5 or more  0.018  0.012  0.107  0.045 
Wealth Quartiles [Q3]:           
Q1  -0.067  0.009  -0.372  0.029 
Q2  -0.009  0.007  -0.178  0.027 
Q4  0.034  0.008  0.328  0.031 
Income Quartiles [Q3]:           
Q1  -0.141  0.008  -0.206  0.029 
Q2  -0.058  0.007  -0.116  0.026 
Q4  0.073  0.008  0.261  0.030 
Survival 10-19 yrs (males)
a  0.024  0.010  -0.039  0.044 
Survival 10-19 yrs (females)
a  0.035  0.022  0.025  0.074 
Most risk averse (males)  -0.005  0.007  -0.022  0.024 
Most risk averse (females)  -0.012  0.007  -0.035  0.024 
Birth Cohort [1923 and earlier]:         
1924-1930 birth cohort  -0.020  0.010  -0.170  0.047 
1931-1941 birth cohort  -0.020  0.011  -0.256  0.051 
1942-1947 birth cohort  0.011  0.013  -0.429  0.056 
1948-1953 birth cohort  0.006  0.015  -0.585  0.061 
Constant  0.623  0.140  12.354  0.570 
Number of observations   95,652      37,218    
R-squared  0.109     0.136    
SOURCE:  Author’s calculations based on 1992-2006 HRS. [excluded category] 
NOTE:  Sample is couples with children or step-children. Excluded categories in parenthesis.  
Wealth and income quartiles defined over the sample of couples.  Transfer amounts are CPI 
adjusted.  Models also include missing indicators for: highest degree, respondent’s (spouse’s) 
deviation of survival probability from life tables and risk aversion.  Robust standard errors. ‘a’ 
indicates coefficient value multiplied by 100. 